If there is a negative terms of trade or financial shock leading to the deterioration in the balance of payments, there are two basic options for a country that has limited foreign exchange reserves. First, a country can maintain a fixed exchange rate (or even a currency board) and wait until the reduction of foreign exchange reserves leads to the reduction of money supply: this will drive domestic prices down and stimulate exports, raise interest rates and stimulate the inflow of capital, and finally will correct the balance of payments. Second, the country can allow the devaluation of national currency -flexible exchange rate will automatically bring the balance of payments back into the equilibrium. Because national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first type of adjustment is associated with the greater reduction of output.
national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first type of adjustment is associated with the greater reduction of output.
The empirical evidence on East European countries and other transition economies for 1998-99 period (outflow of capital after the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian currency crises and slowdown of output growth rates) suggests that the second type of policy response (devaluation) was associated with smaller loss of output than the first type (monetary contraction). 2008-09 developments provide additional evidence for this hypothesis.
The problem
1 UN/DESA (New York), New Economic School (Moscow), Carleton University (Ottawa). The views presented in this paper represent the authors' personal analysis and interpretation and should not be associated with the institutions with which he is associated. but not so good for economic growth ( fig. 2) . When in the late 1990s Argentina experienced the outflow of capital, the government and the central bank were sticking to the currency board arrangement, hoping that the automatic mechanism would finally work: foreign exchange reserves would decrease, money supply would shrink, leading to lower domestic prices and higher interest rates that would finally improve the deteriorating balance of payments. The mechanism was working, but too slowly and with too high costs -the reduction of money supply was bringing down not only inflation, but also output, which contracted by 5% in 1999, 1% in 2000, and another 5% in 2001 2 Sometimes distinction is being made between devaluation (the decision of the central bank to go from one hard peg to another, a lower one) and depreciation (fall in the exchange rate under floating regime). In this paper these terms are used interchangeably to denote the decline of the exchange rate, whatever the reasons of this decline.
( fig.2 ). At this point, it was either the government or the peso that were supposed to fall, and finally both fell in 2002. . Latvian real effective exchange rate increased nearly twofold since 1994 and to regain competitiveness without devaluation Latvia should have experienced a severe deflation -major cuts in prices and wages. The problem is that prices and wages are not that flexible even in "small open economies with good policies", so the price of deflation is a deep recession -a major reduction of output. Is the game worth a candle? 
The literature review and the hypotheses
The debate on Latvia is part of at least century old debate on the advantages and costs of floating and fixed exchange rates and currency boards. The macro textbook theory is based on the MundellFleming model. One of its conclusions is that independent monetary policy is impossible under perfect capital mobility and fixed exchange rate because changes in domestic interest rate take the balance of payment out of the equilibrium with the resulting change in foreign exchange reserves ( fig. 4 ): monetary expansion (LM curve shifts to the right), for instance, results in lower interest rates and outflow of capital, which in turn leads to the lower level of foreign exchange reserves and contraction of the money supply (LM curve shifts back to the left). On the contrary, with the flexible exchange rate the monetary policy is 100% efficient -when monetary expansion leads to the decline in interest rates interest rate and outflow of capital, exchange rate of the national currency falls and this leads to the increase in income (IS curve moves right), so the new equilibrium is established at a point of higher income and the same level (world level) of interest rates. 1999-2002(fig. 3-4) .
Under fully flexible exchange rates the adjustment to the external shock (say, to a fall in prices for exported goods or to an outflow of capital) occurs without changes in FOREX and money supply, but through the exchange rate itself: • Besides, domestic assets after devaluation become cheaper, so there could be a capital inflow (slowdown in capital outflow). This type of adjustment is also painful in a sense that it leads to the decline in consumption (net imports declines after devaluation), but domestic prices do not fall (actually, after some time they start to increase, eating up the pro-competitive effect of devaluation), so there is no depressive effect on output. The goal of this paper is to examine which type of adjustment is associated with greater reduction (slowdown of growth) of output -through money supply and slowdown of inflation or through devaluation. I look at the experience of former communist countries, especially countries of Eastern Europe (which had very different exchange rate regimes), that were affected by the outflow of capital in 1997-99, after the Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) currency crises. To the best of my knowledge, there are no papers examining this particular issue, but of course there is a large literature on the advantages and disadvantages of different exchange rate regime.
Elimination of the currency risk is believed to be the most important advantage of a fixed exchange rate regime (this is even truer for currency boards and dollarization -in the latter case currency exchange transaction costs are also eliminated). The effects of common currencies on the volume of international trade were analyzed in Rose (2000) , Engel and Rose (2002) , Frankel and Rose (2002) and Glick, Reuven and Rose (2002) . This research based on the application of the gravity model produced surprisingly high estimates -international trade in the currency unions is three times more intensive 9 than among similar countries that do not have a common currency. Attempts to capture this effect in the euro area, however failed. Numerous papers (see Frankel, 2008 for a survey) came up with an estimate which is lower by at least an order of magnitude -10-15% increase in international trade in the first few years after the creation of the monetary union.
Hanke (2003), a strong proponent of currency board, points out that according to Eichengreen (2001) The strongest argument against fixed exchange rates is that they force to abandon the independent monetary policy, whereas one-size-fits-all monetary policy obviously does not work. The reduction of output during the Great Depression, as Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and Eichengreen and Irwing (2009) show was greater in countries that stuck to the gold standard, whereas countries that devalued their currencies (China, Japan, Denmark, Sweden) were able to limit the depth of the recession and to avoid sliding into protectionism.
Among the opponents of the currency boards are Roubini (1998) and Krugman (2003) . The latter notes that "a currency board fitted a conservative ideology: by eliminating any discretionary monetary policy, it moved us back toward a pre-Keynesian world. That's why Forbes and the WSJ editorial page sang Argentina's praises; and Wall Street economists swallowed the whole thing".
This issue is also discussed in terms pluses and minuses of exchange rate based stabilization (pegging national currency to a stable currency and using the peg as the nominal anchor) versus the money based stabilization -the policy of setting targets for monetary aggregates (gradually lowering these targets) while keeping the nominal rate flexible. The advantage of former is that it usually is believed to be credible (although there are a lot of cases of spectacular failures -from Russia in 1998 to Argentina in 2002). Money based stabilization allows more flexibility for monetary policy (one size does not fit all argument). For instance, if prices are sticky, so that 10% inflation is needed to avoid the depressing effect on output, then a 10% annual devaluation (provided there is zero inflation elsewhere)
can ensure the stability of RER. The disadvantage of this policy is that there is no automatic mechanism to bring down inflation -everything depends on how strictly the CB will observe the targets.
With regards to the medium-short-term, there is another argument -asymmetric shocks. These latter occur, for instance, when prices of commodities increase. Consider the case of the country that is an oil exporter and another country, which is an oil importer. The increase in oil prices will create a positive trade shock for the exporter and a negative shock for the importer. If both countries have fixed nominal exchange rates, in the former country FOREX would increase, in the latter -decrease. This latter country (oil importer) at the end of the day would not be able to sterilize the decline in FOREX (if the trade shock is significant enough), so the money supply would decrease, prices would fall, and RER would fall as well. Even if prices are perfectly flexible, there would be a need to move resourceslabor and capital -from oil sector to other sectors of the economy. And when oil prices will grow again, there would be a need to move resources in the opposite direction (from other sectors to oil).
Because oil prices fluctuate a lot, it would be unreasonable to move resources back and forth every time there is a trade shock. With fixed exchange rate the room for maneuver to adjust to these temporary shocks is limited.
With fixed exchange rates, or, even more so -with currency board arrangements, effectively forcing countries to abandon their independent monetary policy, they are doomed to adjust to the trade shocks and inflows and outflows of capital through real indicators: when the exchange rate is pegged and prices are not completely flexible, changes in the money supply (caused by the fluctuation of reserves) may affect output rather than prices. And as the recent experience of East Asian and transition economies showed, this kind of real sector adjustment is quite costly. To put it in the simplest form, under fixed exchange rate regime, neither changes in foreign exchange reserves, nor domestic price changes in response to money supply fluctuations provide enough room for maneuver for handling terms of trade shocks and international capital flows.
Most developing and transition economies, with the exception of the smallest ones, like Hong Kong, Singapore and perhaps Baltic states) are large enough to remain not completely exposed to the world market competition and hence to retain some inflexibility of domestic prices with respect to the world market prices. Nevertheless, they are not large enough to create an appropriate cushion in the form of foreign exchange reserves, bringing down the vulnerability resulting from the international capital flows to reasonable levels. In most emerging markets (with the possible exception of China) foreign exchange reserves are normally enough to withstand several weeks, if not days of the attack on the currency. More than that, because the major international banks, investment and hedge funds operate with the pools of money comparable with or even exceeding the value of reserves in most countries, the fluctuations of the exchange rate remain the only reliable and efficient safety valve providing protection from external shocks.
The consensus today, if any, could be probably summarized as follows: whereas exchange rate based stabilization may work at the initial stages of transition for fighting inflation, there is growing evidence that at later stages it becomes an obstacle for economic growth and creates the potential of the currency crisis by allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate.
The story: 1997-99 currency crises in EE and FSU countries
In EE and FSU countries we find a variety of exchange rate regimes (table 1) In order to join the Euro zone candidate countries must stay in ERM and demonstrate that they comply with the Maastricht criteria established for the budget deficit, government debt to GDP ratio, inflation and interest rates ( fig. 6 ).
In 1999 growth rate fell as a result of capital outflow after Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) currency crises ( fig. 7) and there was obviously a slowdown in the growth of money supply ( fig. 8 ) and nominal and real devaluations of national currencies ( fig. 9 ).
Most countries experienced a devaluation of nominal exchange rates in 1997-2000. In 1998-99
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia devalued most, whereas Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, and three Baltic states tried to support the value of their currencies ( fig. 10 ). Finally Czech
Republic in 1997 and Poland in 1998 abandoned fixed exchange rates and moved to managed float.
It is also clear from comparing figs. 11 and 12 that the rates of decline in M2 growth rates was much more pronounced in countries that tried to maintain fixed exchange rate than in countries that accepted devaluation of their currencies. 
Maastricht criteria:
• ERM -Prior to adopting the euro, a member state has to have its currency in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for two years. -Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the current participants in the exchange rate mechanism. -Exchange rate (+15% --15%)
• Budget deficit: <3% • Government debt to GDP: <60% • Interest rates: The nominal long-term interest rate must not be more than two percentage points higher than in the three lowest inflation member states.
• Inflation: No more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the three lowest inflation member states of the EU
Fig. 7
Source: World Development Indicators. Source: World Development Indicators. 
Analysis -output fall and devaluation
Testing econometrically whether the slowdown in growth was more pronounced in countries that experienced greater reduction of money supply and smaller devaluation seems to be a straightforward exercise. There is a complication though: if money supply growth and inflation are brought down from several hundred (or even thousands) percent a year to 20-40%, this has a positive effect on growth rates. But if money supply and inflation growth rates are reduced further, the effect on growth rates is negative.
It was shown, that 20-40% a year inflation is sort of a threshold: there is no evidence that inflation of 20 to 40% annually is ruinous for growth, while there is even some evidence that inflation below 20% a year may be even beneficial (Bruno and Easterly, 1995; Bruno, 1995; Stiglitz, 1998) . Other studies found different thresholds (Polterovich, 2006) , but the principle holds. It may be even argued that the threshold for transition economies is actually higher than for other emerging markets because of the numerous structural rigidities. In most successfully performing transition economies inflation was by 18 no means insignificant: it never fell below 20% a year in the first 5 years of transition in Poland and Uzbekistan, while in China, though it was low most of the time, there were outbursts of inflation in 1988-89 and in 1993-95, when it increased to about 20%. Theoretically, the relationship between inflation and growth (Phillips curve) is different during high and low inflation. When inflation is low, the increase in money supply causes increase in output and increase in prices (because the AS curve is positively sloped). Normally, in the first 18 months there is an increase in output and prices, afterwards -only the increase in prices, output returns to the equilibrium level, because LRAS curve is vertical (all the steam goes into the whistle). This is demand pull inflation -caused by movements of AD curve.
If inflation rises to above 20-40% a year, the relationship between growth and inflation is different.
High inflation and hyperinflation leads to the reduction of the demand for real cash balances, so there is a demonetization, destruction of financial markets and uncertainty for investors. Hence supply curve moves to the left and upwards and the economy experiences the adverse supply shock -output growth rates fall. This is a negative relationship between growth and inflation; it is caused by the structural demonetization factors that lead to the adverse shift in AS curve.
As fig. 13 suggests, Russia obviously had a negative relationship between growth and inflation in the 1990s, when inflation was mostly over 40% a year: every time inflation was brought down (in 1995-97 and from 1999 onwards), growth accelerated.
The same result holds for cross-country comparisons: countries with low inflation exhibited higher growth rates than those with high inflation over the period 1975-95 (countries with inflation above 40% a year actually had negative growth rates).
But if inflation rates are moderate, then attempts to reduce inflation may negatively affect the economy So, there is a positive relationship between growth and inflation in the short-term for relatively low inflation (below 20-40% a year), as is the case in China, for example ( fig. 14) . 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
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relationship between inflation and growth is determined by the movements of AD curve, i.e. there is a regular Phillips curve relationship in the short run (positive), and no relationship in the long run.
High inflation of the early 1990s in former Soviet republics and in many EE countries had an adverse impact on output. Bringing this inflation down from hundreds (and even thousands) percent a year to 20% had a positive impact on growth, but too much of the monetary tightening, like in Russia in 1998
(year on year inflation in July 1998 was 6% only), caused a wave of non-payments and led to a new reduction of output. Regressions are reported in table 2.
Third equation from the table 2: Output loss is always proportionate to M 2 slowdown, but the higher is devaluation as compared to M 2 growth rates, the smaller is output loss (control variables in red): Other things being equal, the slowdown in growth rates in 1998-99 was lower, if preceding inflation was high and the reduction of this inflation rate was also high (these two indicators are correlated, of course -countries that substantially reduced inflation were exactly the ones that had high inflation before). Controlling for this impact of high inflation and transition to low inflation, the relationship between the slowdown in output on the one hand and slowdown of monetary expansion and devaluation looks pretty straightforward. Expression in brackets -the difference between money supply growth and devaluation -characterizes de facto real exchange rate: if money supply grows fast, prices grow fast as well, and nominal devaluation may not be enough to ensure real devaluation, so there is a real appreciation and the higher it is, the greater the suppressing effect of monetary contraction on output.
Expression in brackets is always positive, there is no threshold, but this type of non-linear relationship fits the data better. This expression in brackets is the elasticity of output slowdown on M 2 slowdown, i.e. the magnitude of the impact of monetary contraction depends on the difference between money growth and devaluation. If devaluation in 1997-99 was small, whereas growth rates of money supply in 1995-97 were high, then the decrease in the growth rates of money supply in 1998-99 as compared to 1995-97 led to a very substantial decrease in output in 1998-99. To put it differently, monetary contraction was extremely detrimental to performance, if carried out without devaluation.
Outflow of capital in 2008-09
Capital flows Capital inflows are defined as the sum of financial account, capital account and errors and omissions in the balance of payments data in International Financial Statistics (IMF). They are equal to the difference between the increase in foreign exchange reserves, including gold, and current account balance. Because balance of payments statistics is published with a delay, we proxy capital inflows with the difference between increase in reserves and the trade balance. For most countries, as past data show, this is a very reasonable approximation. Note that the sum of CAPinflQ2 and TRbalINCRQ2 is NOT equal to the increase in the foreign exchange reserves in any particular quarter. Changes in trade balance and capital flows are measured as second differences (increase from Q2 2008 to the average quarterly level of Q3-4 2008 and Q1 2009) , whereas increase in reserves over the same period is measured as the first difference (average increase from the beginning of the quarter to an end of the quarter) .
was possible to mitigate them through devaluation (not allowing foreign exchange reserves to drop by the same amount). If the shocks were large, even devaluation did not allow to avoid output fall.
Conclusions
Countries that responded to external financial shocks -outflow of capital -by devaluating their currencies experienced a smaller slowdown in growth than countries that did not devalue and allowed their money supply to contract. Because national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first type of adjustment (devaluation) was associated with the smaller reduction of output. Except for countries with very high inflation, it seems like external (trade and financial) shocks were less ruinous for the national economy, if they were not met with substantial devaluation.
However, even though adjustment to external shocks is more costly under fixed exchange rates, it does not necessarily mean that flexible rates are better. It may well be that long-term gains (increase in international trade resulting from the elimination of currency risk) outweigh short-term pains (reduction of output in response to external shocks) There may also be political economy reasons for the fixed exchange rate -currency board arrangements. Currency boards ("outsourcing" of monetary policy) are usually supported by the conservatives (rightists). Besides, fixed exchange rate is good for international business, i.e. companies and individuals involved in international trade and capital movement.
